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EQUAL FOOTING: CORRECTING THE
E-COMMERCE TAX HAVEN
I2'>#E?< X@A$ E$@ E <'XX'>1< 3?#R<!+EX ?>'<'A+'1 VE< E
sufficient part of a trade to condition the imposition of a tax
@A <8+# ?>'<'A+'F ;8: !A :@)ER1< '+@A@BRG ?#R<!+EX
presence frequently has very little to do with a transaction
a State might seek to tax.51
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has fundamentally changed the way businesses and
consumers interact. Parties are no longer limited to the goods and markets
within their relative surroundings, but rather have access to people and
places far beyond their physical reach. This is what makes the Internet
special as a tool for interpersonal communication; it is not subject to
physical restraint in the same way humans are, and thus can connect people
to each other to an extent never possible before.
The downside to this elevated state of connection is that the laws
governing commercial interaction are still tied to physical presence. The
Commerce Clause2 and its relevant interpretations3 prevent a state from
taxing interstate commerce unless both sides of the transaction have some
form of physical presence within the state.4 This physical presence
requirement originated in response to the rampant state protectionism under
the Articles of Confederation,5 balancing *)l)Q*4 tax needs with the desire
for free, unburdened flow of commerce. States were permitted to tax
transactions within their borders, but could not extend their taxing power to
parties transacting in other states.
The Internet, on the other hand, is not tied to a physical place. This
liberation allows businesses to expand their interstate activity far beyond
what was economically feasible in the past. As a result, online retail has the
potential to effectively compete with traditional retail, yet is still afforded a
tax advantage over local competitors.6 Despite the equal footing with
traditional commerce in terms of potential capacity, electronic commerce
(e-commerce) is essentially subsidized by the government. This allows
online vendors to undercut traditional competitors who are still required to
comply with a range of state tax obligations.
1. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 327R28 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. 298; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
4. Physical presence fulfills the Nsubstantial nexus8 prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.
See discussion on Complete Auto Transit, infra Part II.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See discussion of Complete Auto Transit test, infra Part II.
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Tax-free purchases made online in lieu of an equivalent purchase at a
physical Nbrick-and-mortar8 location not only takes revenue away from
local retailers, but also deprives the relevant state and local governments of
tax revenue. Every state with a sales tax system in place also has a
complementary use tax, which requires individuals who purchase goods
tax-free in another state or through interstate commerce to report and pay
the equivalent sales tax directly to the state government.7 However, most
individuals are unaware that this tax even exists, and of those who are
aware, very few actually take the time to report and pay what is owed.8 For
the states, the relatively small amounts are generally not worth pursuing on
an individual basis,9 but these missed payments ultimately accumulate into
a fairly significant portion of tax revenue that remains uncollected every
year.
Sales tax receipts made up, on average, 31.3% of state tax revenues in
2014.10 In a time when state governments are struggling to meet their
financial obligations, the loss of such a significant source of revenue is
painful. Yet, legislative and judicial inaction has worked to maintain the
status quo.11
The Supreme Court has expressly left it up to Congress to decide this
issue.12 Congress must act to create and apply a standard that takes into
account the unprecedented effect of the Internet on trade. Instead of using
)LQ *QHHQ+4* -Lh*KTlH -+Q*Q0TQ within a state as a basis for liability, the
standard must be one that is applicable to Internet retailers. That standard is
market presence, which determines tax liability not by physical standards,
but by the +Q)lKHQ+4* QT/0/2KT -+Q*Q0TQ K0 )LQ +QHQ'l0) 2l+IQ). By using the
actual effect on a market as an objective measurement rather than irrelevant
physical consideration, e-commerce retailers are placed on equal footing
with traditional retailers.
Part I of this note jKHH Qil2K0Q L/j )LQ 9(-+Q2Q !/(+)4* K0)Q+-+Q)l)K/0
of the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause has evolved and how
this has affected state authority to tax interstate commerce. Part II will
analyze the current situation, and weigh the pros and cons of the current
economic climate. Part III will explore other possible alternatives and
discuss why they are insufficient or otherwise undesirable. Part IV will
7. Less any sales tax already paid if purchased at a lower rate.
8. Percentage of income tax returns reporting use tax averages 2.08% nationwide. See Nina
Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other States, MINN. H.R. 7 (Apr. 2015),
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf.
9. Id. l) D fNn7mLQ )li )h-KTlHHh K0'/H'Q* *2lHH l2/(0)* /jQS /0 l Hl+MQ 0(2kQ+ /f
transactions for which the individual has not kept records, and the costs of collection could easily
exceed the revenues collected.8ea
10. Cheryl Lee et al., State Government Tax Collections Summary Report: 2014, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAUG14-STC (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/G14-STC-Final.pdf.
11. See infra Part II.
12. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318R19 (1992).
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present a proposal for change and analyze that proposal from both sides,
discussing main objections and ultimately asking whether it will improve
the economic health of the country. Finally, Part V will conclude that there
must be a more appropriate standard implemented to evaluate remote
retailers in a realistic and fair way.
I. BACKGROUND: EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUIONAL LAW
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution govern the
*)l)Q*4 l()L/+K)h )/ )li /()-of-state business.13 For a state tax on interstate
commerce to survive constitutional scrutiny, it must satisfy both clauses.14
To satisfy the Due Process Clausec )LQ+Q 2(*) kQ N*/2Q SQOK0K)Q HK0Ic */2Q
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or
transaction it seeks to tax.815 Additionally, for the tax to survive a Due
Process Clause challenge, N)LQ K0T/2Q l))+Kk()QS )/ )LQ 9)l)Q O/+ )li
purposes 2(*) kQ +l)K/0lHHh +QHl)QS )/ 6'lH(Q* T/00QT)ed with the taxing
State.4816 The Commerce Clause inquiry, on the other hand, is largely
encompassed by the four-part test outlined in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady,17 which requires, among other things, a substantial nexus between
the taxing state and the activity being taxed.18 The inquiries stemming from
each clause are somewhat similar, but each serves a different constitutional
goal: the Due Process Clause is concerned with the fundamental fairness of
government activity, while the Commerce Clause addresses structural
concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy.19
A. THECOMMERCECLAUSEAND PHYSICAL PRESENCE
The Commerce Clause gives Congress plenary power to regulate
commerce and trade amongst the states.20 Inferred, in what is sometimes
TlHHQS )LQ N0QMl)K'Q8 /+ NS/+2l0)8 Commerce Clause,21 K* N)LQ -+K0TK-HQ
that state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place an undue burden
/0 K0)Q+*)l)Q T/22Q+TQa822 The central idea behind the Commerce Clause is
to foster a cohesive economic structure by limiting )LQ *)l)Q*4 -/jQ+ /'Q+
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305R06.
15. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344R45 (1954).
16. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
9)l)Q 7li !/2240c E?_ 5a9a EGAc EFC fG?B@eea
17. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
20. U.S. CONST. l+)a Zc &@c THa E fNn!/0M+Q** *LlHH Ll'Q )LQ -/jQ+m )/ +QM(Hl)Q !/22Q+TQ jK)L
O/+QKM0 Ul)K/0*c l0S l2/0M )LQ *Q'Q+lH 9)l)Q*a8ea
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 401 (4th ed.
2011).
22. Id. at 430.
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objects or affairs that are located in or take place in other states. This
restriction on state power was necessary after the federal government found
itself powerless to stop the rampant protectionism occurring under the
Articles of Confederation.23 In order to prevent the states from impeding
interstate commerce, the Framers reserved to the federal government the
sole authority to regulate and tax interstate commerce, thereby restricting
state authority to tax goods originating from, or bound for, places outside of
its borders.24
Initially, this restriction was absolute. States were prohibited from
HQ'hK0M l )li N/0 K0)Q+*)l)Q T/22Q+TQ K0 l0h O/+2a825 Absolute restriction
gave way to a distinction between NSK+QT) k(+SQ0* on interstate commerce,
which were prohibited, and K0SK+QT) k(+SQ0*c jLKTL MQ0Q+lHHh jQ+Q 0/)a826
The Supreme Court briefly moved away from this distinction in Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,27 a relatively pragmatic decision that
instead focused on whether a tax subjected interstate commerce to a risk of
multiple taxation.28 However, the Court soon returned to the formal
distinction between direct and indirect taxes in Freeman v. Hewit,29 in
which they reformulated the distinction to be /0Q kQ)jQQ0 Nl )li /0 6)LQ
-+K'KHQMQ /O S/K0M K0)Q+*)l)Q k(*K0Q**4 l0S l )li /0 6)LQ -+K'KHQMQ /O
QiQ+TK*K0M T/+-/+l)Q O(0T)K/0* jK)LK0 )LQ 9)l)Qc48 with the former prohibited
as being unconstitutional per se.30 This express prohibition of taxes on the
privilege of doing interstate business was subsequently affirmed in Spector
J@:@> /'>6!+'< 6F 419@AA@>.31
The Spector rule, as it came to be known, was applied somewhat
disastrously in Railway Express Agency v. Virginia32 in 1954 (Railway
Express I) and Railway Express Agency v. Virginia33 in 1959 (Railway
Express II). In Railway Express I, a Virginia statute imposed an annual
HKTQ0*Q )li /0 M+/** +QTQK-)* N6for the privilege of doing business in [the]
State.4834 The Court, utilizing the Spector rule, found the statute to be
23. Id. l) DEF fN# IQh K2-Q)(* O/+ )LQ !/0*)K)()K/0lH !/0'Q0)K/0 K0 GA@A jl* )LQ lk*Q0TQ /O
l0h OQSQ+lH T/22Q+TQ -/jQ+ (0SQ+ )LQ #+)KTHQ* /O !/0OQSQ+l)K/0a8e% see also Quill, 504 U.S. at
EGF fN50SQ+ )LQ #+)KTHQ* of Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed
interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural
KHH*a8ea
24. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
25. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).
26. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
27. W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
28. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (citing W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938)).
29. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
30. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (citing Freeman, 329 U.S.
at 254R57).
31. 9-QT)/+ V/)/+ 9Q+'KTQ 'a =4!/00/+c ED_ 5a9a B_F fG?CGea
32. Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia (Railway Express I), 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
33. Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia (Railway Express II), 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
34. Railway Express I, 347 U.S. at 362.
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unconstitutional.35 In response to the decision, Virginia revised its statute to
NK2-/*Q l 6O+l0TLK*Q )li4 /0 6K0)l0MKkHQ -+/-Q+)h4 K0 )LQ O/+2 /O 6M/K0M
T/0TQ+04 'lH(Q l* 2Ql*(+QS kh M+/** +QTQK-)*c836 a development which led
directly to Railway Express II. Despite having largely the same practical
economic effect as the tax in Railway Express I, the Court in Railway
Express II nevertheless upheld the new statute.37 The irony of these
conflicting outcomes was not lost on the Court, as the Railway Express II
majority recognized that the rule against taxing the privilege of doing
K0)Q+*)l)Q k(*K0Q** NLlS T+Ql)QS l *K)(l)K/0 jLQ+Q 6)LQ (*Q /O 2lMKT j/+S*
/+ HlkQH*4 T/(HS 6SK*lkHQ l0 /)LQ+jK*Q T/0*)K)()K/0lH HQ'ha4838
In the middle of this transition from formalism to pragmatism, the
Supreme Court decided the seminal case National ;'XXE< Q'<< 6F 7'?1: @%
Revenue,39 Ll0SK0M S/j0 l L/HSK0M )Ll) *)KHH SQOK0Q* *)l)Q*4 )liK0M l()L/+K)h
over interstate commerce to this day. National Bellas Hess (NBH) was a
Missouri mail-order retailer serving the state of Illinois, among others.40 An
Illinois statute required any retailer that solicited orders through the use of
mailed catalogues to collect both state and local use taxes, equivalent to
comparable sales tax rates, on every purchase and remit that amount to the
state.41 U"[4* /0Hh T/0)lT) jK)L ZHHK0/K* jl* )L+/(ML Tl)lH/M(Q* l0S
advertisements sent via common carrier, yet the statute enabled Illinois to
impose tax collection duties on the company.42 NBH disputed the statute,
l+M(K0M )Ll) )LQ*Q /kHKMl)K/0* NT+Ql)QnSm l0 (0T/0*)K)()K/0lH k(+SQ0 (-/0
K0)Q+*)l)Q T/22Q+TQ8 l0S )LQ+Qkh 'K/Hl)QS )LQ Commerce Clause and Due
Process Clause.43 Sensing an opportunity to add some clarity to the
situation, the Court agreed to hear the case.
Rather than embracing the thrust toward pragmatism, the Court instead
struck down the Illinois tax.44 This decision to stand firm was based largely
on )LQ SQ*K+Q )/ +Q)lK0 )LQ N*Ll+- SK*)K0T)K/08 kQ)jQQ0 -(+QHh 2lKH-order
sellers and those with a physical presence within the taxing state.45
Eliminating this distinction, Justice Stewart said for the majority, could
NQ0)l0MHQ nK0)Q+*)l)Qm k(*K0Q**nQ*m K0 l 'K+)(lH jQH)Q+ /O T/2-HKTl)QS
/kHKMl)K/0* )/ H/TlH J(+K*SKT)K/0*c846 as sellers would thereby be forced to
collect taxes for, and comply with the laws of, every taxing jurisdiction in
35. Id. at 369.
36. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (citing Railway Express
II, 358 U.S. 434 (1959)).
37. Railway Express II, 358 U.S. at 445.
38. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 284 (quoting Railway Express II, 358 U.S. at 441).
39. Ul)4H "QHHl* [Q** 'a pQ-4) /O :Q'Q0(Q /O ZHHac E@B 5a9a ACE fG?BAea
40. Id. at 753R54.
41. Id. at 755.
42. Id. at 754R55.
43. Id. at 756.
44. Id. at 760.
45. Id. at 758.
46. Id. at 759R60.
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the country. However, because the statute in this case did not turn on
NHlkQHK0M )liQ* )Ll) LlS 6SK+QT)4 /+ 6K0SK+QT)4 QOOQT)* /0 K0)Q+*)l)Q
T/22Q+TQc8 )LQ Spector rule remained good law.47
Another ten years passed before the Court finally overruled the
formalist Spector analysis and instead took a pragmatic approach in
Complete Auto Transit.48 Complete Auto Transit (CAT) was a Michigan
corporation contracted by General Motors to transport vehicles to
dealerships located within the state of Mississippi.49 A Mississippi statute
l**Q**QS )li T/HHQT)K/0 /kHKMl)K/0* /0 NQ'Q+h -Q+*/0 /-Q+l)K0M l a a a
)+l0*-/+)l)K/0 k(*K0Q** a a a jK)LK0 )LK* 9)l)Qc8 l* l T/0SK)K/0 /O N)LQ
privKHQMQ /O a a a S/K0M k(*K0Q** jK)LK0 n)LQm *)l)Qa850 CAT promptly sued,
citing the Spector rule as protection from taxes on the privilege of doing
business in a state, regardless of the practical effects of the tax.51 The Court
O/(0S )Ll) N6nKm) jl* 0/) )LQ purpose of the commerce clause to relieve
those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax
burden.4852 The Spector rule, K0 )LQ !/(+)4* 'KQjc 2Q+QHh Nl))lTLnQS]
constitutional significance to a semantic difference,853 operating only as a
N+(HQ /O S+lO)*2l0*LK-854 )Ll) Nn*mK2-Hh a a a SnKSm not address the problems
with which the Commerce Clause K* T/0TQ+0QSa855
Thus, the Mississippi statute was upheld despite its reference to the
privilege of doing business, which alone would have invalidated it under
Spector.56 In doing so, Complete Auto Transit refocused Commerce Clause
inquiry on practical effects rather than formal demarcations, setting forth a
four-part test that would sus)lK0 l )li KO K) NnGm K* l--HKQS )/ l0 lT)K'K)h jK)L
a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the
*Q+'KTQ* -+/'KSQS kh )LQ 9)l)Qa857
The Court found an opportunity to apply its newly formed test just a
few months later. In National S'@$>E?#!+ /@+1R 6F 9EX!%@>A!E ;)F 4%
Equalization,58 the state of California attempted to collect taxes from the
47. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 322 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
48. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288R@? fG?AAe fN#TT/+SK0MHhc jQ
now reject the rule of [Spectormc )Ll) l *)l)Q )li /0 )LQ 6-+K'KHQMQ /O S/K0M k(*K0Q**4 K* -Q+ *Q
unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate commerce, and that case is overruled.8ea
49. Id. at 276.
50. Id. at 275.
51. Id. at 277R78.
52. Id. at 288 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
53. Id. at 285.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 288.
56. Id. at 288R89.
57. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (quoting Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
58. Ul)4H \Q/M+l-LKT 9/T4h 'a !lH. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
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National Geographic Society (the Society) for their mail-order sales of
Nmaps, atlases, globes, and books.859 The State based its jurisdictional
authority on two office buildings located within the state, despite the fact
)Ll) N)LQ /OOKTQ* -Q+O/+2nQSm 0/ lT)K'K)KQ* +QHl)QS )/ )LQ a a a 2lKH /+SQ+
k(*K0Q**a860 The Society argued that the activity being taxed had no
connection with the State beyond common carrier or the mail.61 Regardless,
the Court found the unrelated property to be a sufficient connection and
upheld the tax.62 The Court justified its decision on the grounds that the
offices, while unrelated, generated enough revenue that they were more
)Ll0 N)LQ *HKML)Q*) -+Q*Q0TQc8 l0S thereby were sufficient enough to
establish a nexus with the state and validate the tax in question.63
Finally, the most recent foray into state tax validity under the
Commerce Clause was in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.64 Quill Corp. (Quill)
was a Delaware corporation that sold office equipment into the state of
North Dakota.65 All merchandise was delivered by mail or common carrier,
and Quill maintained no office or sales force in the state.66 North Dakota
imposed tax collection duties on every retailer with a place of business
within the state.67 In 1987, North Dakota amended the statutory definition
/O +Q)lKHQ+ )/ K0TH(SQ NQ'Q+h -Q+*/0 jL/ Q0MlMQ* K0 +QM(Hl+ /+ *h*)Q2l)KT
*/HKTK)l)K/0 /O l T/0*(2Q+ 2l+IQ) K0 )LQ *)l)Qc868 and in turn defined
N+QM(Hl+ /+ *h*)Q2l)KT */HKTK)l)K/08 )/ 2Ql0 )L+QQ /+ 2/+Q lS'Q+)K*Q2Q0)*
within a 12-month period.69 Quill argued that the statute was
unconstitutional and, surprisingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled in
;(KHH4s favor, refusing to follow precedent on the notion that N6jL/HQ*lHQ
TLl0MQ*4 K0 k/)L )LQ QT/0/2h l0S )LQ Hlj 2l[ke] it inappropriate to follow
[the rule from] Bellas Hess )/Slha870
The facts of Quill were almost identical to Bellas Hess and the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled accordingly, ignoring the North Dakota Supreme
!/(+)4* l--QlH )/ -+/M+Q** l0S K0*)QlS upholding the Bellas Hess bright-line
rule.71 Despite the apparent trend away from rigid standards seen in
59. Id. at 552.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 560.
62. Id. at 562.
63. Id. at 556R57. While arguably consistent with precedent, this line of reasoning effectively
removed the need for any substl0)KlH )+l0*lT)K/0lH /+ /-Q+l)K/0lH 0Qi(* (0SQ+HhK0M l *QHHQ+4*
physical presence. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 324 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
65. Id. at 302.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 57-40.2-07).
68. Id. at 302R03 (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 57-40.2-01(6)).
69. Id. at 303 (citing N.D. Admin. Code § 81-04.1-01-03.1).
70. Id. (quoting State by Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 213 (1991), >'61) sub
nom. Quill, 504 U.S. 298).
71. Id. at 317.
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Complete Auto Transit and, to a lesser extent, National Geographic, Bellas
Hess had never been officially overruled. The fact that Congress had not
taken steps to update or otherwise adjust the prevailing standard in the
twenty-five years since its creation provided additional support for adhering
to precedent.
As for the apparent trend toward pragmatism following the debacle in
both Railway Express I and II, the majority claimed that Complete Auto
Transit and its progeny all involved sellers with physical presence and were
thus distinguishable from the case at hand.72 Complete Auto Transit, the
majority said, was not directed at formalism in general, but rather
concerned the specific distinction between taxes on the privilege of doing
interstate business and all others, jLKTL N*Q+'QS 0/ -(+-/*Q within [the
!/(+)4*m Commerce Clause jurisprudence.873 Indeed, the majority argued
that the demarcation of mail-order sellers and sellers with a physical
presence does further the ends of the dormant Commerce Clause by
providing a safe harbor from state interference for purely interstate
commerce.74 Looking forward, the majority reconciled its position with
Complete Auto Transit and National Geographic by holding that physical
presence is encompassed by the substantial nexus prong of the Complete
Auto Transit test, effectively incorporating a categorical safe harbor for
mail-order sellers into the substantial nexus requirement.75
This safe harbor *)l0S* K0 SK+QT) /--/*K)K/0 )/ )LQ !/(+)4* -+K/+
rejection of the philosophy underlying Freeman and Spector, that
NK0)Q+*)l)Q T/22Q+TQ *L/(HS Q0J/h l */+) /O 6O+QQ )+lSQ4 K22(0K)h O+/2
*)l)Q )lil)K/0a876 However, the majority ignored this in favor of the
convenience provided by a bright-line standard,77 choosing instead to focus
on the rejection of the words themselves without any thought as to the
logical basis for the Complete Auto Transit C/(+)4* +QJQT)K/0 /O Spector.78
The Complete Auto Transit Court emphasized that the Spector +(HQ NLl* 0/
+QHl)K/0*LK- )/ QT/0/2KT +QlHK)KQ*879 l0S Nn*mK2-Hh a a a S/Q* 0/) lSS+Q** )LQ
-+/kHQ2* jK)L jLKTL )LQ !/22Q+TQ !Hl(*Q K* T/0TQ+0QSa8 80
72. Id. at 314.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 314R15.
75. Id. at 311.
76. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (citing Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249, 252 (1944)).
77. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
78. As noted above, the Complete Auto Transit SQTK*K/0 jl* kl*QS /0 )LQ KSQl )Ll) N6[i]t was
not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their
just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of S/K0M k(*K0Q**a48 Complete Auto
Transit, 430 U.S. at 288 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
(1938)).
79. Id. at 279.
80. Id. at 288.
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Justice White wrote a scathing dissent along these lines for the Quill
Court, in which he claimed the majority completely missed the point of
Complete Auto Transit and its place in the evolution of Commerce Clause
analysis.81 He felt the Complete Auto Transit test was a waypoint in the
overall evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence from formal,
categorical distinctions, to pragmatic analysis of economic effects,
Q'KSQ0TQS K0 -l+) kh )LQ !/(+)4* SQHKkQ+l)Q TL/KTQ )/ (*Q )LQ )Q+2
N*(k*)l0)KlH 0Qi(*8 O/+ )LQ OK+*) -+/0M /O )LQ )Q*) +l)LQ+ )Ll0 -Lh*KTlH
presence.82 He argued that the majority improperly conflated the two
standards in the interest of preserving a clear bright-line rule, resulting in a
conceptual step backwards.83
Justice White next argued rather persuasively that the Complete Auto
Transit test is really a Due Process Clause inquiry, and that substantial
0Qi(* Tl0 kQ *l)K*OKQS kh l *QHHQ+4* 2K0K2(2 T/0)lT)* jK)L )LQ )liK0M
state.84 Furthermore, Justice White pointed out that the Commerce Clause
considerations originally used to justify the physical presence requirement
were no longer served by the retention of a bright-line distinction that had
effectively been rendered obsolete in the years between Bellas Hess and
Quill.85
The majority ultimately acknowledged that NT/0)Q2-/+l+h Commerce
Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to
l+K*Q O/+ )LQ OK+*) )K2Q )/Slha886 Despite this concession, the majority felt
that the benefits of a bright-line rule and principles of stare decisis
persuaded against overruling Bellas Hess with regard to Commerce Clause
analysis.87 Regardless, the true basis for keeping the status quo was that the
majority regarded the Commerce Clause issue as N0/) /0Hh /0Q )Ll)
Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has
)LQ (H)K2l)Q -/jQ+ )/ +Q*/H'Qa888 True to its word, the Court has declined to
revisit the issue since Quill.89
81. Quill, 504 U.S. at 322R23 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. See id. at 326R27.
83. Id. l) EFE fN3Ll) n)LQ !/(+)m SK*l'/jQS K0 Complete Auto jl* 0/) J(*) )LQ 6O/+2lH SK*)K0Tb
)K/0 kQ)jQQ0 6SK+QT)4 l0S 6K0SK+QT)4 )liQ* /0 K0)Q+*)l)Q T/22Q+TQ4 a a a k() lH*/ )LQ jL/HQ 0/)K/0 a a
a )Ll) 6K0)Q+*)l)Q T/22Q+TQ K* K22(0Q O+/2 *)l)Q )axationa48ea
84. Id. at 327.
85. Id. at 327R28. Justice White believed that taxing remote vendors with minimum contacts
would not burden interstate commerce to the same extent as when Bellas Hess was decided. It
should be noted that he took this position long before e-commerce became a legitimate force in
the economy. These arguments only gained strength as technology rendered established physical
presence somewhat irrelevant to the retail industry.
86. Id. at 311 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 315R17.
88. Id. l) EG@ fN#TT/+SK0MHhc !/0M+Q** K* 0/j O+QQ )/ SQTKSQ jLQ)LQ+c jLQ0c l0S )/ jLl)
extent the States may burden interstate mail-/+SQ+ T/0TQ+0* jK)L l S()h )/ T/HHQT) )liQ*a8ea
89. See infra Part II.
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B. THEDUE PROCESSCLAUSEAND FAIRNESS
The essence of the Due Process Clause is fairness, and central to this
concept is the requirement that an individual has sufficient connections with
a given state to give notice or fair warning that he or she is under the
jurisdictional power of that state.90 Jurisdictional analysis under the Due
Process Clause was initially based on the *)l)Q4* -Lh*KTlH -/jQ+ /'Q+ -Q/-HQ
and property within its borders.91 Conversely, this notion of state
sovereignty precluded one *)l)Q O+/2 K2-K0MK0M (-/0 l0/)LQ+ *)l)Q4*
authority over things within its own borders.92 This strict physical
requirement quickly became obsolete. The advent of railroads and
automobiles allowed Americans much greater mobility and therefore the
ability to have a much greater impact on people and property in other
states.93 Thus, a more flexible standard was necessary in order to adapt to
the changing times.
Due Process Clause interpretation began with International Shoe Co. v.
Washington and the creation of what is now known as the minimum
contacts test.94 Rather than strictly requiring physical presence as a
predicate for in personam J(+K*SKT)K/0c )LQ !/(+) LQHS )Ll) NS(Q -+/TQ**
requires only that . . . [the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with
[the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
0/)K/0* /O OlK+ -Hlh l0S *(k*)l0)KlH J(*)KTQa895 3K)L )LK* )Q*)c )LQ SQOQ0Sl0)4*
contacts with the taxing state would serve as a proxy for notice, thus
expanding state power over potential controversies while also remaining
true to the underlying ideals of the Due Process Clause.96 The
socioeconomic climate in America was undergoing rapid change at the time
of the case, and the new jurisdictional paradigm created by International
Shoe was as much a reflection of society at large as it was a legal solution
to an economic need.97
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.98 soon tested the boundaries
of the minimum contacts test.99 Lowell Franklin, a resident of California,
90. Quillc C?D 5a9a l) EGF fN3Q Ll'Q a a a KSQ0)KOKQS 60/)KTQ4 /+ 6OlK+ jl+0K0M4 l* )LQ l0lHh)KT
)/(TL*)/0Q /O S(Q -+/TQ** 0Qi(* l0lHh*K*a8ea
91. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
92. Id. at 722.
93. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4.2 (3rd ed. 2012).
94. Z0)4H 9L/Q !/a 'a 3l*LK0M)/0c EF6 U.S. 310 (1945).
95. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added).
96. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992).
97. International Shoe was decided in 1945 just as World War II was ending and soldiers were
returning home. A unifying event of that magnitude meant that people began to think of
themselves less as state citizens and more as national citizens. Interstate travel and business
inc+Ql*QS l* N*)l)Q HK0Q* -+/klkHh 2Ql0) HQ** )Ll0 )LQh LlS K0 )LQ -l*)a8 FREER, supra note 93, §
2.4.3.
98. McGee v. Int4H WKOQ Z0*a Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
99. Id. at 223R24.
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purchased life insurance from an Arizona company.100 Another Texas
insurance company later purchased the Arizona company and moved its
operations to Texas.101 As part of the transition, the Texas company sent
reinsurance letters to all customers of the old Arizona company containing
the same terms as their previous contracts.102 Besides collecting ]+l0IHK04*
monthly insurance payments, the Texas company had no other contact with
the state of California.103 Once Franklin passed away, his mother, Lulu
McGee, attempted to collect his life insurance payout, but the Texas
company refused.104
The Court ultimately upheld jurisdiction in California predicated on the
single insurance contract.105 Though the decision was purportedly based in
part on convenience, the main basis was that the Texas company had
reached out to the plaintiff with the reinsurance contract.106 The Court
recognized that this was a significant extension of jurisdictional power past
its traditional physical boundaries. However, noting the trend away from
strict physical requirements, the Court used the new minimum contacts test
from International Shoe to justify predicating jurisdiction on the single
T/0)+lT)c Q2-Ll*KgK0M )LQ NO(0Sl2Q0)lH )+l0*O/+2l)K/0 /O /(+ 0l)K/0lH
QT/0/2h /'Q+ )LQ hQl+*a8107
McGee marked arguably the farthest extension of jurisdictional power
under the minimum contacts test. The expansion, however, was short-lived.
Six months later, Hanson v. Denckla LQHS )Ll) l -HlK0)KOO4* N(0KHl)Q+lH
lT)K'K)h8 Tl00/) kh K)*QHO Q*)lkHK*L T/0)lT) jK)L )LQ *)l)Qc l0S )Ll) )LQ
SQOQ0Sl0) 2(*) lH*/ N-(+-/*QO(HHh l'lKHnm K)*QHO /O )LQ -+K'KHQMQ /O
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
-+/)QT)K/0* /O K)* Hlj*a8108 Without this limitation in place, defendants
j/(HS kQ l) )LQ 2Q+Th /O )LQ -HlK0)KOO4* TL/KTQ /O O/+(2a109
100. Id. at 221.
101. Id. at 221.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 222.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 224.
106. Id. at 223R24. The Court raised legitimate issues as to the ability of individual defendants
to afford litigation against large corporations located in remote states. However, these concerns
were not only ignored in subsequent cases, but effectively overruled in terms of importance. See,
e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
107. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222. N7/Slh 2l0h T/22Q+TKlH )+l0*lT)K/0* )/(TL )j/ /+ 2/+Q 9)l)Q*
and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of
commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state
lines.8 Id. at 222R23; cf. Hanson, 357 U.S. at FCG fNnZm) K* l 2K*)lIQ )/ l**(2Q )Ll) )LK* )+Q0S LQ+b
lHS* )LQ Q'Q0)(lH SQ2K*Q /O lHH +Q*)+KT)K/0* /0 )LQ -Q+*/0lH J(+K*SKT)K/0 /O *)l)Q T/(+)*a8ea
108. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
109. Courts always have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff, as the plaintiff consents by
choosing the forum. FREER, supra note 93, at 39R40, § 2.1. Note, however, that parties must first
meet the threshold requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction.
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Next, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson emphasized fairness
and balance with a set of factors intended to reliably address Due Process
Clause fairness concerns.110 This turned Due Process Clause analysis into a
two-prong test requiring a plaintiff to show both minimum contacts and
fairness.111 Finally, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz both formally adopted
the two-step approach from World-Wide Volkswagen and simultaneously
expanded its use from tort claims, which was the only context in which the
minimum contacts test had previously been used, to a contract dispute,
thereby implicitly validating its use for all Due Process Clause analyses.112
Thus, after Burger King, the Due Process Clause inquiry requires both that
the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum
state, and that the assertion of jurisdiction based on those contacts would
comport with fair play and substantial justice.113
Bellas Hess began the modern line of tax-specific analysis under the
Due Process Clause.114 When deciding whether to uphold or strike down a
state tax on interstate commerce, Bellas Hess held that the simple question
that courts must ask is NjLQ)LQ+ )LQ *)l)Q Ll* MK'Q0 l0h)LK0M O/+ jLKTL K)
Tl0 l*I +Q)(+0a8115 However, the Bellas Hess Court ultimately departed
from the general Due Process framework due to the close interrelation with
Commerce Clause concerns inherently present in taxes on interstate
commerce. The two clauses, the Court said, l+Q NTH/*QHh +QHl)QS8 l0S )Ll)
Nn)mLQ *l2Q -+inciples have been held applicable in determining the power
/O l 9)l)Q )/ K2-/*Q a a a )liQ* (-/0 K0)Q+*)l)Q *lHQ*a8116 The Court then
proceeded to frame the combined analysis in terms of physical presence in
the taxing state, ultimately holding that the tax in question did not satisfy
Due Process Clause concerns for the same reason that it failed to satisfy the
Commerce Clause.117
This framework remained largely unchanged until Quill addressed the
issue twenty-five years later. Fittingly, the Court began by distinguishing
the Due Process Clause from the Commerce Clause, 0/)K0M )Ll) N)L/(ML
/'Q+Hl--K0Mc )LQ )j/ T/0TQ-)K/0* l+Q 0/) KSQ0)KTlHa8118 After acknowledging
the distinction and thus giving itself room to accommodate its own
110. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
111. Id.
112. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 417 U.S. 462 (1985).
113. Id. at 476.
114. The Court gives a succinct run-down of criteria for validity under both clauses early in the
majority opinion. See Nat4H "QHHl* [Q** 'a pQ-4) /O :Q'Q0(Q /O ZHHac E@B 5a9a ACEc ACB fG?BAea
115. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 757R59.
118. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part
l0S SK**Q0)K0M K0 -l+)e f,(/)K0M Z0)4H [l+'Q*)Q+ !/a 'a pQ-4) /O 7+Ql*(+hc EFF 5a9a ED_c ECE
(1944)).
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holding,119 the Court then expressly overruled National Bellas Hess to the
extent that it required a physical presence in the taxing state to survive Due
Process Clause scrutiny.120 This decision was predicated on the idea that NKO
a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an
QT/0/2KT 2l+IQ) K0 )LQ O/+(2 9)l)Qc K) 2lh *(kJQT) K)*QHO )/ )LQ 9)l)Q4* in
personam J(+K*SKT)K/0 Q'Q0 KO K) Ll* 0/ -Lh*KTlH -+Q*Q0TQ K0 )LQ 9)l)Qa8121
The Quill Court further supported its rejection of a physical presence
requirement under the Due Process Clause with language from its decision
in Burger King, in which it observed that NK) K* l0 K0Q*Tl-lkHQ OlT) /O
modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted .
. . across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a
State.8122 Therefore, by removing the physical presence requirement from
Due Process Clause analysis, the Court ensured that a seller could no longer
l'/KS J(+K*SKT)K/0 N2Q+QHh kQTl(*Q )LQ n*QHHQ+m SKS 0/) physically enter the
forum *)l)Qa8123
In rejecting physical presence, Quill finally reconciled the Due Process
Clause analysis of state taxing authority with )LQ !/(+)4* -+/M+Q**K/0 ljlh
from strict physical limitations under International Shoe. Whether
Commerce Clause jurisprudence makes the same move will likely remain
unknown, as the Supreme Court has refused to review any more cases on
this topic.
II. WHERE THE LAW CURRENTLY STANDS
Remote vending has grown from the niche market of mail-order
catalogs described in Bellas Hess into a significant force in the national
economy. Americans spent over $348 billion USD on electronic and mail-
order goods in 2013,124 with that number expected to grow anywhere from
$414 billion125 to $493.89 billion USD126 by 2018, a projected increase of
15.94 to 29.54%. Electronic and mail-order sales, as a percentage of all
119. Had the Court not led by distinguishing Due Process Clause concerns from Commerce
Clause concerns, it would have overruled its own bright-line rule that it later uses to define
Commerce Clause limitations. See supra Part I.A; see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 317R18.
120. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
121. Id. at 307 (emphasis in original).
122. Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King Co. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
123. Id. at 307R308 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).
124. Annual Retail Trade SurveyK2013: Sales (1992-2013), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 9,
2015) [hereinafter Annual Retail Trade Survey], http://www.census.gov/retail/index.html (follow
N9lHQ* fG??F-F_GEe> ^iTQH8e f7LQ Sl)l QiTH(SQ* O//S *Q+'KTQ K0S(*)+h OKM(+Q*a 3K)L O//S *Q+'KTQ
figures included, e-commerce makes up 3.72% of all retail in 2003 and 6.95% in 2013, a similar
86.83% increase).
125. U.S. E-Commerce Sales, 2014-2018, INTERNET RETAILER,
https://www.internetretailer.com/trends/sales/us-e-commerce-sales-2013-2017/ (last visited Oct.
29, 2015).
126. Retail Sales Worldwide Will Top $22 Trillion This Year, EMARKETER (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Retail-Sales-Worldwide-Will-Top-22-Trillion-This-
Year/1011765.
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retail sales, rose from 4.12% in 2003 to 7.79% in 2013, an 89.08%
increase.127 Because e-commerce is almost exclusively comprised of
interstate transactions, its rise as a percentage of retail sales poses a real
threat to state governments, which gained an average of 31.3% of their
overall tax revenue from sales taxes in 2014, 128 down from 33.5% in
2002.129
As the numbers continue to grow and manifest into real-life problems,
it becomes clearer that changes need to be made. Congress has made
several attempts to address the issue, most recently with the Marketplace
Fairness Act of 2015 (MFA).130 While none of these federal attempts have
been successful thus far, state and local governments collaborated with
private members of the business community to create the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).131 SSUTA is a voluntary arrangement
lK2QS l) N*K2-HKOhning] and moderniz[ing] sales and use tax administration
K0 )LQ 2Q2kQ+ *)l)Q*8132 whereby remote vendors engaging in interstate
commerce agree to collect use taxes on behalf of other member states in
QiTLl0MQ O/+ )LQ 2Q2kQ+ *)l)Q*4 lM+QQ2Q0) )/ K2-HQ2Q0) *KM0ificant
changes in the substance and administration of their tax codes.133
Member state simplification measures under SSUTA include:
designating a single entity responsible for sales and use tax
administration;134 capping potential tax audits at one per state per period;135
adopting a single unified tax rate throughout the state and eliminating local
variations;136 providing notice of and creating a sufficient grace period
between enactment and implementation of rate changes;137 providing a
shared database of all potential tax rates in the country that is collectively
maintained and updated by all member states;138 implementing standardized
rules for sourcing purchases;139 implementing standardized rules for
creating and claiming exemptions;140 and creating a uniform tax return
127. Annual Retail Trade Survey, supra note 124.
128. LEE ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
129. Dennis Zimmerman, Economic Issues in Taxing Internet and Mail-Order Sales, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. 4R5 (Oct. 2003),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/46xx/doc4638/10-20-internettax.pdf.
130. See infra Part IV.
131. STREAMLINED SALES ANDUSE TAXAGREEMENT (STREAMLINED SALES TAXGOVERNING
BD. 2015) (as amended through September 17, 2015) [hereinafter SSUTA].
132. Id. § 102.
133. What is the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement?, STREAMLINED SALES TAX
GOVERNING BOARD, http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=gen_1 (last visited Oct.
29, 2015).
134. SSUTA, § 301(A).
135. Id. § 301(B).
136. Id. §§ 302, 308.
137. Id. §§ 304, 329.
138. Id. §§ 305(DRI), 307(A).
139. Id. §§ 309R315.
140. Id. §§ 316R317.
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refund procedure and collection remittance policy for all member states.141
SSUTA also provides a liability shield for sellers that relied on erroneous
data supplied by a member state.142 While states have had mixed reactions
to SSUTA,143 it nonetheless provides an important framework for other
proposed solutions such as the MFA.144
As for the federal judicial system, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
addressed the tax imbalance in over twenty years. Quill was decided in
1992, when e-commerce was nowhere near the level it is today. Yet the
Supreme Court has preferred to leave the issue up to Congress, as the Quill
majority so plainly stated.145 Some lower courts, however, have proactively
dealt with the e-commerce tax issue in lieu of further legislative or judicial
action.146
Recently, the case Overstock.com v. New York Dep1t of Taxation and
Fin. came before the New York Court of Appeals.147 Internet retailers
Overstock.com (Overstock) and Amazon.com (Amazon) challenged an
amended New York statute that sought to impose tax collection duties on
out-of-state companies that directly or indirectly used in-state residents for
sales referrals. Overstock and Amazon claimed the amendments were
unconstitutional under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.148 Both
retailers had affiliate programs whereby third parties placed links on their
own websites that, when clicked, directed users to #2lg/04* /+
='Q+*)/TI4* website.149 The retailers compensated their affiliates on a
commission basis, paying them a percentage of the revenue generated by
affiliate-driven sales.150 Some of these affiliates were physically based in
New York, thus establishing physical presence under the statute.151
The Court began its analysis by noting that since the Quill decision,
N[t]he world has changed dramatically . . . and it may be that the physical
presence test is outdated. An entity may now have a profound impact upon
a foreign jurisdiction solely through its virtual projection via the
Internet.8152 Bound by Quill precedent, the Court looked for the slightest
141. Id. §§ 318R319, 325.
142. Id. §§ 306, 331.
143. As of October 31, 2015, twenty-three states are full members. Streamline Sales Tax State
Members, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC.,
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=state-info (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
144. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015). See also infra Part
III.A.
145. See supra Part I.B.
146. See, e.g., Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Ya 9)l)Q pQ-4) /O 7lil)K/0 . ]K0ac ?@A Ua^aFS BFG
(N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 622R24.
149. Id. at 622R23.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 623.
152. Id. at 625.
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trace of in-state activities performed by, or on behalf of, the retailers and
their employees in order to establish the required physical nexus.153
Agreeing with the defendantPthe N.Y. Department of TaxationPthe Court
found that the affiliate program outlined above constituted N[a]ctive, in-state
solicitation8 sufficient to bind Overstock and Amazon to the New York
statute.154
The issue seemed ripe for Supreme Court review, as the facts presented
a clear and salient picture of the effect of e-commerce on the retail industry,
and would allow for a definitive ruling on the matter. However, the
Supreme Court denied the appellants4 writ of certiorari, thereby making
clear that it truly did intend to leave the issue for Congress to decide.
In his dissenting opinion in Quill, Justice White showed a strong desire
to be rid of the anachronistic demarcation of retailers from Bellas Hess,
arguing that the convenience of a bright-line rule does not justify the
unfairness it produces.155 With remarkable foresight, Justice White
identified the inequality created by the e-commerce tax haven and
questioned Nthe rationality of perpetuating a rule that creates an interstate
tax shelter for one form of business -- mail-order sellers -- but no
countervailing advantage for its competitors.8156 Given that Justice White
expressed this perspective over twenty years ago, it would have been
extremely interesting to see how the Supreme Court handled the issue
today. However, its rejection officially puts the situation in Congress4s
hands and opens the door for proposal and debate on the topic, of which
there has already been a considerable amount.
III. ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS TO GOVERN E-COMMERCE
The MFA represents the first serious consideration of whether to allow
states to collect sales tax on Internet sales to make any headway in
Congress. The bill has its flaws, but it serves as an important catalyst for
discussion of the problem facing the retail market. Other proposals have
been made to Congress by people and representatives from all over the
sociopolitical spectrum, ranging from ex-Senators to nonprofit workers.
These proposals include an origin-sourced tax on interstate commerce,
private consumer self-reporting of use taxes, and simply implementing a
uniform, flat sales tax rate nationwide.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 626.
155. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 329 (1992) (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977)).
156. Id.
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A. THEMARKETPLACE FAIRNESSACT OF 2015
1. Proposal
Senator Michael Enzi (R-WY) introduced the MFA in March of
2015.157 The bill is currently sitting before the Senate Committee on
Finance.158 Senator Enzi introduced largely the same bill during the last
Congressional term and it passed the Senate, 159 only to die in the House of
Representatives.160
The MFA gives states the ability to compel qualified out-of-state
vendors to collect and remit sales tax payments from purchasers if the state
meets certain simplification requirements.161 Specifically, the MFA requires
states to appoint a single entity within the state responsible for: (1) all state
and local sales and use tax administration; (2) limiting audits to one per
state per seller; (3) consolidating sales and use tax returns for all state and
local jurisdictions into one simple return to be filed with the single
responsible entity; and, (4) providing a uniform sales and use tax base162
among the state and local jurisdictions.163 Participation in the MFA is
entirely voluntary, leaving the choice of whether or not to compel tax
collection on remote sales up to state legislatures.164
States are required under the bill to provide free software to any
company they wish to collect taxes from.165 Potential providers of the
software would apply and be chosen through a certification process, after
which they would be assigned a region and begin production.166 The
software must be able to not only calculate applicable sales and use tax
rates for any and all sales, but also update itself regularly and automatically
file a sales tax return to all relevant jurisdictions.167 In the event of human
error, such as a mistake in the program code, incorrect entries into the tax
157. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015).
158. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015 Overview, U.S. CONGRESS,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/698?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%
22marketplace+fairness+act%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
159. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th CongressK1st Session, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&sessi
on=1&vote=00113 (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
160. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 Overview, U.S. CONGRESS,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/743 (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
161. S. 698, § 2(b).
162. This would eliminate local variances amongst states, allowing only one tax rate per state
and thereby reduce the total number of taxing jurisdictions in the United States from over 7,000 to
just forty-sixPthe forty-five states who currently collect sales tax and Washington, D.C.
163. S. 698, §§ 2(b)(2)(A)(iRiii).
164. 7LQ kKHH 2Q+QHh Nl()L/+KgQ*8 *)l)Q* )/ kQMK0 T/HHQT)K0Ma 7LQ kKHH lH*/ lSS* 2(H)K-HQ
conditionsPmostly adaptations of the requirements from SSUTAPthat a state must meet in order
to gain authorization. Id. § 2(b).
165. Id. § 2(b)(2)(D)(ii).
166. Id. § 2(b)(2)(D)(iii).
167. Id. § 2(b)(2)(D)(ii).
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database, or neglect by the retailer, the MFA shields the non-culpable
parties from liability.168 As an additional layer of protection, the MFA
requires notice of any changes in tax rates from participating jurisdictions at
least ninety days prior to the change.169
Perhaps the most significant provision of the MFA is the small business
exception.170 Under this safe harbor, sellers with annual gross receipts
derived from remote sales of less than $1,000,000 USD (the threshold) are
classified as small businesses and are thereby exempt from tax collection
liability.171 This shields small businesses from the potentially enormous cost
of compliance with forty-six different taxing jurisdictions, each with their
own filing and auditing procedures, as well as the cost to integrate the free
tax software into current computer sales programs and networks.
2. Criticism of the Marketplace Fairness Act
The MFA is an admirable attempt at a workable solution that identifies
and addresses legitimate concerns typically raised in the Internet sales tax
debate. There is no easy solution, as the issue is complex and nuanced, the
stakes are high, and there are many competing viewpoints and interests.
However, the MFA contains significant weaknesses, the most crucial of
which are the small business exception and the required compliance
software.
The inclusion of the small business exception suggests an implied
acknowledgement by the drafters of the sizeable burden this bill imposes on
retailers. The threshold is calculated on a nationwide basis,172 so that
companies on the margin could go from having no tax liability in any
remote jurisdiction, to becoming the collection agent for forty-six different
states overnight. This incentivizes tax-avoidance maneuvers, such as sales
or marketing restrictions, which burden interstate commerce and reduce the
overall efficiency of the national marketplace.173
The threshold is based on gross annual receipts, which, despite being
expressly limited to revenue derived from online sales, sets a very low bar.
Using gross sales receipts fails to take into account the size of a company4s
profit margin, which has more of an effect on small businesses than gross
revenue. For instance, $1,000,000 USD in gross annual receipts in an
industry that typically carries a 1% margin nets $10,000 USD in profit,
whereas $1,000,000 USD in gross annual receipts in an industry with a 6%
margin nets $60,000 USD, a difference of 500%. That $50,000 USD
difference in gross profit alone could finance most if not all of the cost of
168. Id. § 2(b)(2)(ERG).
169. Id. § 2(b)(2)(H).
170. Id. § 2(c).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See discussion on efficiency concerns, infra Part IV.A.4.
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integration, thereby putting the company with the 6% margin in a much
better financial position than its counterpart, despite collecting the same
amount in gross annual receipts.
To put this in a practical context, the average net margin for online
retailers is around 2.34%.174 This means that, after the normal costs of doing
businessPcost of goods sold, wages, overhead, etc.P$1,000,000 USD
translates into $23,400 USD of net income for a sole proprietor or
partnership. Integration of the software alone could easily cost that much,
not to mention the cost of compliance with numerous taxing jurisdictions.
The MFA does provide some protection from liability in the case of human
error,175 but it does not cover these integration costs, nor does it address
additional costs associated with audit compliance or litigation in faraway
states. Although the MFA describes its $1,000,000 USD threshold as a
protection for small businesses, once the typical net margin size is taken
into account, it becomes clear that the threshold does not actually provide
much protection at all.
Online auction house eBay.com (eBay) agrees176 and criticizes the
threshold as being NQi-/0Q0)KlHHh HQ**8 than what current federal standards
define as the threshold between small- and medium-sized businesses.177 The
number, it claims, does not accurately reflect the reality of the business
world l0S j/(HS /0Hh -+/)QT) NTl*(lH /0HK0Q *QHHQ+*c 2/*) /O jL/ n*KTm
would not be subject to tax collection obligations anyway.8178 eBay further
notes that the low threshold would strip away the opportunity the Internet
presents for startup companies to expand their business online by
introducing burdensome new tax obligations.179
Another weakness of the MFA is that the NO+QQ8 */O)jl+Q -+/'KSQS kh
the taxing state is not actually free. The state covers only the purchase price,
leaving owners to pay out of pocket to integrate the required software into
their current systems.180 Integration of a new program is typically much
more complicatedPand costlyPthan simply installing the software.181
174. Aswath Damodaran, Margins by Sector (US), N.Y.U. STERN,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/margin.html (last updated Jan.
2015).
175. S. 698, § 2(b)(2)(ERG).
176. Debunking the Myths Around the Marketplace Fairness Act, EBAY MAIN STREET (May 3,
2013), http://www.ebaymainstreet.com/news-events/debunking-myths-around-marketplace-
fairness-act.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. S. 698, § 2(b)(2)(D)(ii) (The use of the lang(lMQc Nn-m+/'KSQ a a a */O)jl+Q O+QQ /O TLl+MQ O/+
+Q2/)Q *QHHQ+*c8 *(MMQ*)* )Ll) K) K* J(*) )LQ */O)jl+Q K)*QHO )Ll) K* -+/'KSQS kh )LQ *)l)Qc jLKHQ
integration costs are left to the company.).
181. Ron Shmelzer & Jason Bloomberg, Understanding the Real Costs of Integration,
TECHTARGET (Oct. 24, 2002), http://searchsoa.techtarget.com/news/859301/Understanding-the-
real-costs-of-integration.
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After the initial setup, the company must then pay to configure the
software, cover ongoing maintenance costs, and make sure to set aside cash
in case there are any significant changes to the system.182 Although
integration expenses can be tax-deductible for those with sufficient income,
the company must still cover the initial cost with cash or debt. For
companies existing at the margin, the financial impact of these additional
costs is magnified and can cause significant hardship.
The sudden nature of the small-business exception and corresponding
threshold, combined with hidden costs associated with the proposed
software system, make the MFA an unattractive proposal. High costs across
the board would force many to finance implementation with debt, which
can be expensive for companies without a robust balance sheet, or finance
with equity, which opens the company up to extensive regulatory burdens.
Financing issues could deter many smaller businesses from using the
Internet to expand operations and potentially bankrupt those who do. This
simply shifts the competitive edge back to local business and seriously
diminishes the Z0)Q+0Q)4* potential as a tool for economic growth. In short,
the MFA would address the current situation, but in a decidedly undesirable
way.
B. ORIGIN-SOURCED TAX
1. Proposal
An origin-*/(+TQS )li *h*)Q2 TlHT(Hl)Q* )liQ* (*K0M )LQ *QHHQ+4* H/TlH
tax rate.183 Whereas a destination-sourced tax system requires the seller to
calculate the exact tax rate of wherever the buyer happens to be located, an
origin-sourced system simply requires the seller to apply one single tax rate
to every transaction.184 The beauty of this proposal is its simplicity: origin
sourcing significantly reduces compliance costs associated with destination
sourcing, eliminates the need for specialized software, and curbs the threat
of unforeseen costs such as audits or litigation in the state in which the
buyer resides. Instead of over 7000 separate state and local taxing
jurisdictions, a seller would only need to comply with the procedures for the
one in which he or she is located.185 An example of this can be found in the
182. Id.
183. Exploring Alternative Solutions on the Internet Sales Tax Issue: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 127R28 (2014) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript] (written
testimony of Andrew Moylan, Senior Fellow and Outreach Director, R Street Institute).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 127.
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European Union4* *h*)Q2 /O lS 'lH/+Q2186 taxes on business-to-consumer
sales and services across member-country borders.187
Origin sourcing does not require any substantial change to the current
legal framework. Since it is the business that is legally obligated to pay
sales tax, not the consumer,188 the origin-sourced system complies with the
Bellas Hess and Quill requirements in that the seller would, by definition,
always have a physical presence within the taxing jurisdiction. Therefore,
the collecting state would only be taxing companies that already have a
physical presence within its borders.189
2. Criticism of Origin Sourcing
Despite the attractive simplicity and consistency of an origin-sourced
tax system, the concept raises numerous issues: (1) the system constitutes
taxation without representation; (2) it subjects purchasers to foreign laws
without their consent; and, (3) it Ll* )LQ -/)Q0)KlH )/ K0*)KMl)Q l N+lTQ )/ )LQ
k/))/2a8
]K+*) l0S O/+Q2/*)c /+KMK0 */(+TK0M K* NTHQl+Hh )lil)K/0 jK)L/()
+Q-+Q*Q0)l)K/0a8190 Not only would buyers be controlled by the laws of a
foreign jurisdiction, the tax revenue paid would go to the benefit of that
*)l)Q +l)LQ+ )Ll0 )LQ k(hQ+4*a If a customer in Texas wants to purchase
goods from a company in Maine, that customer would be forced to pay
Maine taxes, a state in which the customer has no representation. The Texas
customer would be subjected to the tax laws of a jurisdiction in which he or
she does not live, enacted by a legislature that he or she did not vote for,
which fund public services the customer will never gain any benefit from.
The nature of the Internet as a far-reaching means of communication
only exacerbates this problem, as buyers would frequently be subjected to
foreign laws against their consent under an origin-sourced system. It is well
established that, by physically entering the jurisdiction of a sovereign body,
a person is consenting to its system of laws.191 In contrast, a customer on his
or her computer at home in one state, by the virtue of clicking a button,
could be unwittingly binding him or herself to the laws of another state, all
186. Ad valorem taxes are taxes that are imposed proportionally on the value of something,
rather than on its quantity or volume as with an excise tax. Sales taxes are ad valorem taxes.
187. Hearing Transcript, supra note 183, at 128 (written testimony of Andrew Moylan,
Outreach Director and Senior Fellow, R Street Institute).
188. #H)L/(ML )LQ 2/0Qh (H)K2l)QHh T/2Q* O+/2 )LQ T/0*(2Q+4* jlHHQ)c )LQ HQMlH k(+SQ0 )/
collect, and resulting liability if tax is not collected, is on the seller.
189. Hearing Transcript, supra note 183, at 127R28 (written testimony of Andrew Moylan,
Outreach Director and Senior Fellow, R Street Institute).
190. Id. at 199.
191. This principle stems from the theory of tacit consent as a basis for government and the rule
of law. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 364 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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depending on where the seller happens to be located.192 Online purchasers
could potentially be taxed by any number of governing bodies without any
say in the matter.193 For companies such as Amazon that have regional
distribution centers, it may not be apparent even to the company itself
where exactly the goods are being shipped from until after the sale is made
l0S )LQ T(*)/2Q+4* *LK--K0M K0O/+2l)K/0 K* +QTQK'QSa194
This lack of representation is magnified in the context of the five states
that do not levy a sales tax.195 If a resident of the state of Oregon, which
does not levy a sales tax, makes a purchase online and is charged, for
Qil2-HQc W/(K*Kl0l4* *lHQ* )lic196 not only are his individual rights as a
resident of Oregon being violated, but the sovereignty of the entire state of
Oregon is similarly compromised. Oregon voters have repeatedly defeated
measures to implement statewide sales taxes,197 yet an origin-sourced
system would force Oregon residents to not only pay sales tax on the goods
they purchase, but to pay it to the government of an entirely different state.
Furthermore, there is still no concrete basis for determining what
exactly constitutes a physical presence, and cases such as National
Geographic and Overstock only further complicate the issue.198 Retailers
located in a state with no sales tax face a potentially severe penalty if they
l+Q O/(0S )/ kQ K0T/++QT)Hh /-Q+l)K0M (0SQ+ )LQ /+KMK0 *)l)Q4* )li Hlj* jLQ0c
in fact, they had a physical presence in the destination state all along. In
such a situation, all but the most financially sound companies would be
considerably disabled if suddenly billed for a significant amount of back
taxes, plus interest, by multiple states around the country.
Finally, origin sourcing also opens up the possibility of a Nrace to the
bottom,8 in which remote sellers simply move their base of operations to a
jurisdiction with little-to-no sales tax in order to take advantage of the
origin-sourcing system.199 At a hearing before the House of
Representatives, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) recounted his
experience in the N.Y. State Legislature after the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha, 200
192. 7LQ )h-KTlH /0HK0Q *L/--Q+ K* (*(lHHh 0/) ljl+Q /O )LQ J(+K*SKT)K/04* )li Hlj* )Ll) LQ /+ *LQ
will be subjected to. See, e.g., Hearing Transcript, supra note 183, at 215R16.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Those states are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Lee et al.,
supra note 10, at 2.
196. Louisiana has among the highest sales tax rates in the United States. See, e.g., Scott
Drenkard, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2014, TAX FOUNDATION (Mar. 2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/FF420.pdf.
197. See, e.g., Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1980M1987, OREGON BLUE BOOK,
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections20.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
198. See supra Parts I.A and II.
199. Hearing Transcript, supra note 183, at 131 (written testimony of Andrew Moylan,
Outreach Director and Senior Fellow, R Street Institute).
200. Marquette Nat4l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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which held that credit card usury laws were to be sourced from the state
issuing the card.201 Credit customers were traditionally protected by their
*)l)Q4* (*(+h Hlj* (0)KH Marquette officially authorized an origin-sourced
system instead.202 In Representative Nadler4s experience, banks
immediately began moving their credit card operations to states in which
there were Nessentially . . . no regulations.8203 The banks then threatened
their home states to weaken or repeal their usury laws or risk losing their
business entirely, and the states ultimately complied.204
There is no reason to believe that history will not repeat itself. Aside
from some logistical issues involved with delivering a physical product, the
incentive structure under an origin-sourced system is essentially the same as
the one created by the Marquette decision. This becomes evident through a
simple cost-benefit analysis: if the competitive edge gained by avoiding
compliance costs and selling tax-free outweighs the cost of relocationPplus
any other potential disincentives, such as increased property or income
taxesPthe best decision is for the company to relocate. Manipulation of
this sort is especially likely for firms centered on e-commerce, as Internet
retailers are able to handle most administrative and logistical functions from
a single office building and thus do not require an extensive physical
presence throughout the country. The relocation itself would be relatively
easyPall the retailer has to do is pack up its servers and find some office
space to rent in a state with favorable tax laws.
Simply put, the attractive simplicity of an origin-sourced system does
not make up for the numerous problems it would create upon
implementation.205 Aside from the constitutional issues raised in requiring
buyers to adhere to the laws of foreign states, origin sourcing would tip the
scale too far in favor of e-retailers, as they would then be free to relocate to
tax-free jurisdictions and continue to undercut competition. Therefore, the
implementation of an origin-sourced tax system would only exacerbate
current tax problems by increasing economic inefficiency from tax
avoidance, and ultimately weakening )LQ 0l)K/04* QT/0/2KT LQlH)L /'Q+lHHa
201. Hearing Transcript, supra note 183, at 168 (referring to Marquette, 439 U.S. at 301)
(account shared by Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member of the House Committee on the Judiciary).
202. Id. at 168R69.
203. Id. at 169.
204. Id.
205. In reality, the simplicity of the proposal is largely negated by the fact that most retailers
would still be required to comply with local tax laws of every state in which they maintain a phys-
ical presence.
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C. CONSUMER PRIVATEREPORTING
1. Proposal
Consumer Private Reporting (CPR) is simply the enforcement of
existing use tax laws through a system of self-reporting.206 Mr. James H.
Sutton, Jr. proposed the CPR system at a recent hearing before the House of
Representatives.207 At the hearing, Mr. Sutton claimed that the main
problem with the current situation is not that states cannot collect sales tax
on Internet sales, but rather that use tax laws routinely go unenforced
because states simply do not have either the information or the financial
incentive to enforce them.208 The CPR system addresses this by creating a
consolidated federal database to which companies send interstate sales
figures accumulated over the prior fiscal year.209 The sales figures would be
combined in a 1099-style format for each purchaser to access in order to file
their own use tax returns with the respective states.210 Relevant information
would be presented as general dollar figures in order to protect consumer
privacy.211 However, the itemized receipts would be stored securely in the
+Q2/)Q 'Q0S/+4* *h*)Q2c */ )Ll) l T(*)/2Q+ Tould choose to identify
specific items in order to claim an exemption.212
The filing process, as well as the mechanisms for pursuing non-filers,
would utilize the existing framework in place for sales taxes.213 In this way,
the CPR system proposes no new laws, instead enforcing laws that are
already on the books using methods that are already in place.214 Sales and
use tax laws would even be simplified to an extent, in that businesses would
not be burdened with tax collection duties for numerous taxing
jurisdictions,215 and there would be no debate over where to source the tax
rate. Customers of remote vendors would feel compelled to self-report
remote purchases once state and local governments actually started
enforcing use tax laws, thereby bringing interstate sales more in line with
local sales and lessening the economic inequality.216
206. Hearing Transcript, supra note 183, at 76 (written testimony of James H. Sutton, Jr., CPA,
Esq., Shareholder, Moffa, Gainor, & Sutton, P.A.).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 75.
209. Id. at 81.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 83.
216. Id.
2015] Correcting The E-Commerce Tax Haven 301
2. Criticism of Consumer Self Reporting
The CPR system, while conceptually appealing, raises significant
practical issues. Implementation would require the creation of an enormous
new federal database, new reporting mechanisms for sellers to use, and new
software to access the database. Consumers would be forced to remit lump
sums of tax debt out of pocket at specified times. If a consumer fails to pay,
he or she will presumably be subject to the same penalties as companies
who fail to remit sales tax collections along with all associated interest,
fees, and potential legal costs. Finally, the CPR system introduces what
could be perceived as an entirely new tax obligation, even if states are
merely enforcing existing tax laws.217
Aside from the sheer logistics of creating such an enormous database
from scratch, there is no guarantee that federal databases would be entirely
secure. In 2013, hackers attacked Target Corp. and compromised up to 40-
million credit card and debit card numbers, in addition to the corresponding
encrypted personal identification numbers (PIN numbers).218 If hackers
could easily steal massive amounts of personal data from a mega-
corporation like Target, it seems perfectly reasonable to assume that
hackers could also infiltrate the security systems of a small- to medium-
sized business, gaining full access to itemized records of every purchase in
lSSK)K/0 )/ T(*)/2Q+*4 personal identification information.
On the public side, even the federal government itself is not safe. In
June of 2015, federal officials discovered a massive breach of the Office of
Personnel Management, whereby the personal data of millions of federal
employees was stolen directly from federal databases.219 Personal data is
much more sensitive than the purchase data at issue, so if personal
information can be so easily taken from federal databases, there is no
guarantee that taxpayer use tax information will be sufficiently protected.
The fact that neither the government, nor private companies, are safe from
cyber-attack does not cultivate much faith in a CPR system centered on an
electronic database.
The CPR system is also a very costly and time-consuming proposal,
even if Congress were to include liability protection similar to that of the
MFA.220 Implementation would require the creation of entirely new
software programs for vendors to access the relevant databases. Even if the
217. At least, the use tax obligation would be perceived as new insofar as the consumer has
never had to pay it before. Id. at 166 (answer given by James H. Sutton, Jr., CPA, Esq.,
Shareholder, Moffa, Gainor, & Sutton, P.A.).
218. Jim Finkle & David Henry, Exclusive: Target Hackers Stole Encrypted Bank PINsK
Source, REUTERS (Dec. 25, 2013, 12:44 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/25/us-
target-databreach-idUSBRE9BN0L220131225.
219. Kate Vinton, Hackers Stole & J!XX!@A U')'>EX WB?X@R''<1 2'><@AEX 7E:E, FORBES (Jun. 4,
2015, 6:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/06/04/4-million-federal-employees-
personal-information-stolen-in-data-breach/.
220. See infra Part IV.A.
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government were to provide the software as proposed by the MFA,221 the
cost of implementation still presents a significant burden to small retailers.
Furthermore, CPR includes no compliance thresholdPevery seller,
regardless of size or relative ability, would immediately be required to
collect customer purchasing data and remit that data to the appropriate
states. Failure to comply could result in the assessment of interest, fines,
and potentially even legal fees, all in addition to the increase in accounting
costs required to manage potential audits from every taxing jurisdiction in
the country.
The lack of security, implementation and compliance costs, negative
perception, and financial inconvenience of the CPR system make it an
unattractive solution. Merely enforcing existing laws is appealing on its
face, but when the laws in question have not only been sparsely enforced,
but would also require the creation of an entirely new reporting and
collection system, it becomes clear that the solution is more trouble than it
is worth.
IV. PROPOSAL: MARKET PRESENCE AS A PROXY FOR
PHYSICAL PRESENCE TO RESTORE FAIR COMPETITION
IN THE RETAIL MARKET
Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential
SQOQ0Sl0)4* lOOKHKl)K/0 jK)L l State . . . it is an inescapable fact of modern
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely
by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the
need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted.222
These words, written over thirty years ago, become even more relevant as
the Internet attains greater prevalence in our modern economy. In many
industries, the Internet has almost completely obviated the need for any
physical presence within a state. We are quickly reaching the point at which
a single out-of-state company, selling online, could potentially dominate the
relevant market in its neighboring state without ever having to charge or
collect a dime in taxes. Not only does this undercut local establishments, it
also deprives the relevant state and local governments of vital tax revenue.
The Commerce Clause, originally meant to protect and foster interstate
commerce, now effectively discriminates against intrastate business by
shielding companies with comparable sales and distribution capabilities
from the same tax burdens carried by local retailers. Therefore, it is
essential to adapt our constitutional analysis to reflect this paradigm shift.
The applicable standard must be flexible enough to accommodate evolving
221. Id.
222. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 417 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
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technology, yet concrete enough to continue to meet legal and economic
needs. That standard is market presence.
Part A of this section will examine both the actual mechanics as well as
the resulting economic benefits of market presence. Part B will analyze
market presence under the constitutional framework derived from Bellas
Hess and its progeny to argue that it satisfies both Due Process and
Commerce Clause concerns. Finally, Part C will discuss various criticisms
of market presence and offer rebuttals in defense.
A.MECHANICSOF THEMARKET PRESENCE STANDARD
Market presence is a way of establishing jurisdiction by using a
T/2-l0h4* QT/0/2KT -+Q*Q0TQ in the market as a proxy for physical
presence. Rather than focusing on whether the seller physically occupies
space within the state, which often has little impact on the underlying
transaction, the focus is instead on the economic reality of the situation.
Market presence adapts the substantial nexus prong of Commerce Clause
analysis to a more pragmatic inquiry that brings state taxation of interstate
commerce in line with the rest of in personam jurisdictional analysis, which
has long since moved away from rigid physical constraints.223 Market
presence is meant to govern situations where a state would otherwise be
justified in asking a company to collect sales or use taxes on its behalf, but
is barred from doing so solely because the company has no physical
presence within the state. Therefore, market presence seeks to enforce
justifiable taxes that comply with the underlying purpose and intent of the
Commerce Clause, but are nonetheless invalidated by loopholes and
technicalities in the current law.
Presence is determined through a system of intelligent thresholds based
on business size standards for the specific region, industry, and market in
which a particular company operates. The thresholds are meant to measure
l -l+)KT(Hl+ T/2-l0h4* *lHQ* '/H(2Q and corresponding impact on the
market in question. Once the company4* Tl*L OH/j O+/2 +Q2/)Q *lHQ* K0 )LQ
market become substantial enough to qualify it as a medium-sized business,
market presence is established and the company can be considered
effectively present for jurisdictional purposes. At this point, when the
company is operating at a capacity comparable to local competitors, it is
entirely fair for the state to ask it to carry a comparable tax burden.
Business size information is taken from the Small Business
#S2K0K*)+l)K/04* )lkHQ /O *KgQ *)l0Sl+S*224 and broken down by state and
region. Companies are classified by North American Industry Classification
223. See discussion on the evolution of Due Process Clause jurisprudence, supra at Part I.B.
224. Table of Small Business Size Standards Matched to North American Industry
Classification System Codes, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf.
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System (NAICS) codes, which they can then use to determine the relevant
threshold for their particular line of business. Governments can similarly
use this same information for collection and enforcement purposes. The
main idea is to establish a standardized, neutral, and transparent system of
classification to ensure fairness and consistency of application.
Thresholds are calculated using )LQ T/2-l0h4* M+/** -+/OK)* SQ+K'QS
from the relevant market.225 Each threshold is separate and distinct, so that a
company can only incur tax burdens in areas where it has earned them.
Gross profits are used instead of other financial measures, such as Earnings
Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA) or net
income, because of its location on the income statement. It is calculated
after the cost of goods sold is deducted, which negates differences in profit
margin from one industry to the next. Similarly, it is calculated before
general and administrative expenses are deducted, which eliminates both
the incentive and the ability to manipulate taxable income through creative
accounting or overspending and keep the company below the threshold. By
using gross profit as a benchmark, companies are less likely to base
spending decisions on tax avoidance rather than value added, resulting in
greater efficiency throughout the system.
Market presence takes an individualized approach to threshold
calculation, addressing each industry in which a particular company
maintains a presence on a distinct and individual basis.226 On one hand, this
requires greater specificity in bookkeeping as well as more in-depth formats
for state sales tax returns. However, this also discourages unnecessary
splintering into subsidiaries, which could result in inefficiency resulting
from the loss of economies of scale, as companies could not avoid tax
liability by separating their high-volume product lines from the rest. Most
importantly, an individualized threshold approach eliminates the possibility
that companies could simply release sham product lines in order to increase
their aggregate threshold and thereby avoid tax liability altogether.227
Market presence undoubtedly sets a fairly high standard of liability,
which means that many companies will be unaffected. However, this is
necessary to ensure fairness and a truly level playing field. The fundamental
idea behind interstate tax reform is that retailers of a certain size should not
be exempt from sales tax collection, but it would be just as unfair to impose
potentially enormous compliance costs on small businesses trying to use the
225. \+/** -+/OK) K* l T/2-l0h4* )/)lH +Q'Q0(Q HQ** )LQ T/*) /O M//S* */HSa
226. For example, for a company that sells both clothing and mining equipment, the clothing
line would be assessed separately and measured against a threshold specific to the clothing
industry in that area, whereas the mining equipment would be measured against a threshold
specific to the mining equipment industry in that area.
227. Under an aggregate approach, a clothing company operating above its threshold could
ostensibly begin to sell mining equipment. Even if the company never sold a single unit, the new
mining venture would provide plenty of cushion to continue operating its profitable clothing line
free of tax liability. Utilizing an individualized approach eliminates this tactic.
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Internet to expand and grow their market share. The potential for residual
inequality with these companies is outweighed by the many benefits of
market presence: it evens the retail field without being unfairly burdening
or favoring one particular group; it protects small business owners from
enormous compliance costs in allowing for pro rata accumulation and
compartmentalization of tax obligations; it is adaptable and flexible enough
to remain relevant as technology evolves; and, it increases efficiency in the
marketplace.
1. Market Presence Levels the Playing Field for Interstate and
Intrastate Commerce
Market presence ignores occasional, sporadic sales that have little effect
on the local economy while ensuring that legitimate competitors in an area
are governed by the same rules as local establishments. Once an out-of-state
company earns enough sales to surpass the threshold, it has reasonably
reached the point where it is just as competitive, and its presence is just as
legitimate, as local businesses. When that threshold is met, market presence
is established, the competitive edge is removed, and parties are placed on
level ground. Accordingly, this ensures that an out-of-state retailer will not
suddenly be subjected to tax collection burdens based on a few scattered
sales, as they have little effect on the state economy and thus pose little
threat to local businesses. The newly acquired tax burdens will be the same
as those borne by the local competitors. It is not until the out-of-state
retailer starts to significantly cut into local sales that its tax-exempt status
will change and it will be required to carry the same burden as local
vendors. Thus, no matter the level of sales into a given market, the
competitive atmosphere will be maintained.
2. Market Presence Protects and Fosters Small Businesses
The most important difference between market presence and the
proposals discussed previously is that market presence offers much greater
protection for small businesses. Under plans like the MFA, marginal
companies would suddenly be subject to tax collection obligations
anywhere in the country the moment they surpass $1,000,000 USD in total
online sales for the year. This threshold would not significantly burden the
likes of retail behemoths, such as Amazon, that have enough revenue to
absorb the additional costs. Rather, the companies that would most struggle
with this sudden burst of obligation are the smaller-to-mid-sized companies
that barely clear the $1,000,000 USD mark.
Market presence, on the other hand, distributes the overall tax burden to
those states where the retailer generates enough sales, allowing for the
gradual accumulation of collection obligations as the company meets gross
margin benchmarks. This distributive property limits liability to where and
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when the retailer is most capable of handling them, rather than forty-six
different states simultaneously imposing new tax-collection duties the
moment a company surpasses a given national sales threshold. As discussed
above, the individualized focus of the market presence thresholds allow
small business owners room to maneuver as they approach the liability
threshold. Dependi0M /0 )LQ T/2-l0h4* OK0l0TKlH *K)(l)K/0c 2l0lMQ2Q0)
has the ability to split apart the company into subsidiaries in order to break
up cash flows and avoid triggering tax liability.
Companies additionally have substantial risk management capabilities
with market presence. Management can split the company apart in order to
compartmentalize risk and thereby confine potential damage from litigation
or extensive audits to the affected units without the entire organization
suffering as a result. The separation limits the distributive property of
market presence and prevents cross-contamination of business segments.
While the separation would result in the loss of economies of scale, this is
not as much of a concern for smaller companies, as the loss would be
outweighed by the relatively large gain in liability control and reduction of
potential damage.
Compliance costs are confined to a certain proportional share of a
company4s gross profits for a given area, ensuring that the eventual costs
can be met by the time they are accrued. Retailers are able to predict,
prepare for, and then safely expense compliance costs rather than being
forced to finance compliance through debt. Company managers can ensure
that enough taxable income exists to reap the tax benefits, thereby financing
compliance in part with government assistance through a lowered tax bill.
The ability to accumulate compliance costs over time also allows a retailer
to take the tax savings from prior compliance efforts and put it towards
impending tax burdens in other regions, adding certainty that its obligations
will be met and expensive fines will be avoided.
3. Market Presence Increases Economic Efficiency
The physical presence standard leaves gaps and loopholes in tax
enforcement that create substantial economic inefficiency. The most
significant effect of this inefficiency is rising distortion costs,228 which
occur when either consumption decisions or business decisions, or both, are
motivated by tax considerations rather than the cost efficiency of
production, distribution, and sales.229 Although goods sold online may use
228. Distortion is economic inefficiency arising from uneven taxation of goods. See
Zimmerman, supra note 129, at vii.
229. Id. at 8. Consider a customer who purchases books online, tax-free, for $100 USD,
inclusive of shipping costs. The same books could be purchased at a local bookstore for $102
USD, inclusive of a $5 USD sales tax charge. Resource costs and value for the Internet book are
$100 USD, which includes profit, materials, labor, and shipping/logistics. Resource costs and
value for the local books, however, are only $97 USD because the extra $5 in tax is a direct
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extra resources in shipping and distribution, the loopholes in the current
system of tax laws create the incentive for a manufacturer to avoid
expansion into physical outlets and instead choose to sell tax-free online so
long as the additional logistical cost is less than potential compliance costs
that would be incurred through physical presence.
This decision wastes resources in the desire for tax avoidance that could
otherwise be used for production or distribution. However, with market
presence, larger e-commerce retailers would not be able to take advantage
of distortion costs to gain a competitive edge,230 as physical location is
irrelevant. At the same time, a limited safe harbor would still be available
for smaller businesses to make their initial foray into a market
electronically, rather than waste resources in a failed physical expansion.
Market presence would not entirely remove the incentive to avoid tax
compliance for businesses operating below the threshold. However, these
residual costs would be offset by the elimination of the more substantial
distortion costs created by larger retailers, resulting in a net efficiency gain.
4. Market Presence is Flexible and Adaptable to Economic
Realities
Unlike the substantial nexus standard and its basis of physical presence
from Bellas Hess and Quill, market presence is based on a relatively
flexible standard. Market presence is measured by dollar amounts, sales
figures, and other basic economic measurements that, unlike physical
presence, will always be an integral part of any sales transaction. Industry
numbers would be broken down by state and region so that each threshold
for market presence is calculated to fairly represent the individual market. If
a given industry grows or shrinks enough so that the threshold is no longer
an accurate determination of economic effect, the threshold can be
increased or decreased accordingly. Thus, while based on concrete data to
an extent, the state thresholds will remain tied to fundamental notions of
fairness by allowing for expansion or contraction in response to market
fluctuations. The flexibility of market sensitivity combined with the solid
base of hard sales data ensures that the market presence standard can adapt
to the rapidly changing technological landscape and continue to be a useful
tool.
transfer from the customer to the government that uses no resources. The resulting differential
O+/2 )LQ T(*)/2Q+4* -+Q*(2QS 0/0T/2-HKl0TQ jK)L )LQ (*Q )lic jLQ)LQ+ O+/2 KM0/+l0TQ /+
through a de minimis exception, results in a $3 USD loss of efficiency. Rather than being used to
produce $3 USD worth of other goods or services, the $3 USD is instead spent on unnecessary
logistics and shipping costs. Id.
230. Currently, the incentive for large companies to choose inefficient locations based on tax
avoidance is twofold: not only do large companies enjoy economies of scale that reduce the cost
of competing in remote markets, but they also face greater potential compliance costs, litigation
costs, and tax penalties than their local competitors due to their size.
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B. CONSTITUTIONALITYOFMARKET PRESENCEASA
JURISDICTIONAL PREDICATE
A major point worth repeating is that the Supreme Court in Quill
explicitly left final regulatory authority up to Congress.231 Thus, at least
concerning the Commerce Clause, this proposal does not need to fit within
current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Regardless, the proposal does fit neatly within the constitutional
framework already in place. Rather than supplanting the established
physical standard from National Bellas Hess and its progeny, market
presence serves as a proxy for physical presence, similar to how minimum
contacts serves as a proxy for notice under Due Process Clause analysis.232
The only difference between the current and proposed analyses is merely an
adaptation of the physical aspect of substantial nexus to a standard better
suited to govern modern economic reality. Just as International Shoe
extended the reach of personal jurisdiction past the physical boundaries set
in Pennoyer v. Neff233 while still recognizing the validity of physical
presence as a jurisdictional predicate under Pennoyer,234 market presence
only supplements physical presence, extending the substantial nexus
requirement to cover those retailers operating within the technological
loophole implicit in the current system.
1. Due Process Clause
Due Process Clause analysis is fairly straightforward with market
presence, as it is designed in such a way that Due Process Clause concerns
are met before market presence is ever triggered. The threshold requirement
is calculated to explicitly exclude sellers with brief or sporadic contact with
the forum state as both a protection for small businesses and a way to
maintain fairness. This ensures that the seller has undoubtedly established
minimum contacts with the forum state by the time its activities are
substantial enough to give rise to tax collection duties. In a way, market
presence is effectively governed by the minimum contacts test, in that the
same activity that establishes minimum contacts also establishes market
presence. As for fairness concerns, the market presence thresholds are
calculated to be at or beyond the point at which it not only becomes fair for
a state to impose tax collection duties, but also the point at which it
becomes unfair to continue to allow the out-of-state retailer to operate tax-
free. In other words, the threshold is not triggered until )LQ *)l)Q4* QiQ+TK*Q
of jurisdiction over the retailer is fair and justified.
231. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
232. See, e.g., id. at 313.
233. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
234. Z0)4H 9L/Q !/a 'a 3l*LK0M)/0c EFB 5a9a EG_c EG?R20 (1945).
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Market presence lH*/ Q0*(+Q* )Ll) )LQ *)l)Q -+/'KSQ* */2Q)LK0M NO/+
jLKTL K) Tl0 l*I +Q)(+0c8235 and that taxes will kQ N+l)K/0lHHh +QHl)QS8 )/ )LQ
*QHHQ+4* lT)K'K)h jK)LK0 )LQ *)l)Q.236 Each sale made within a state requires
some use of that *)l)Q4* OlTKHK)KQ* K0 /+SQ+ )/ complete the transaction.
Though remote vendors may not utilize state facilities to the same extent as
local vendors, they still enjoy numerous benefits provided by the state. 237
Those benefits support every transaction, as state facilities are directly or
indirectly necessary to complete the exchange. Thus, any incident giving
rise to tax liability will have made use of state facilities and enjoyed state
-+/)QT)K/0c J(*)KOhK0M )LQ *)l)Q4* +Q,(Q*) O/+ +Q)(+0 under Wisconsin v. J. C.
Penney.238
Justice Fortas noted in his National Bellas Hess dissent that N[NBH]
enjoys the benefits of, and profits from the facilities nurtured by, the State .
. . as if it were a [physical] retail store.8239 Thus, any incident giving rise to
tax liability will have made use of state facilities and enjoyed state
-+/)QT)K/0c J(*)KOhK0M )LQ *)l)Q4* +Q,(Q*) O/+ return. As noted above, sales tax
only arises upon completion of the sales transaction, which fully confines
the taxes in question to the activities that gave rise to jurisdiction in the first
place. Therefore, the income subject to taxation will always be rationally
related to the activities carried out within the state.
Finally, the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause is also
logically satisfied by the market presence standard. An entity that is
Nengaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a
State . . . has 6OlK+ warning that [its] activities may subject [it] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.48240 The threshold requirement again
ensures that a business has ample notice of impending tax collection duties
by the time those duties are officially imposed. Despite the lack of physical
presence, a substantial amount of continuous and widespread solicitation of
business within the state is required before the state is allowed to exercise
taxing jurisdiction over a business. Thus, notice is easily established
through the normal course of business.
Market presence has substantial requirements that must be met before it
can be used as a basis for tax liability. Thus, considerations under the Due
235. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
236. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
237. For example, these facilities may include: police protection of the customers who gave the
company their money, maintenance of an electrical grid to power )LQ T(*)/2Q+*4 T/2-()Q+* l*
they made their purchases, and the protection and support of the banking system that processes the
transaction. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 328 (White, J. dissenting).
238. Wisconsin, 311 U.S. at 444.
239. Ul)4H "QHHl* [Q** 'a pQ-4) /O :Q'Q0(Q /O ZHHac E@B 5a9a ACEc ABF fG?BAe f]/+)l*c Yac
dissenting), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
240. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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Process Clause are easily equaled and surpassed by the time a state can
begin to exercise jurisdiction over a remote vendor.
2. Commerce Clause
Validity under the Commerce Clause is determined by using the four-
part test from Complete Auto Transit,241 which is designed to prohibit undue
burdens on interstate commerce as well as limit the reach of state taxing
authority. Market presence easily satisfies all four prongs.242
a. Tax Must be Applied to an Activity with a Substantial Nexus
with the Taxing State
9(k*)l0)KlH 0Qi(*c (0SQ+ )LQ 9(-+Q2Q !/(+)4* -+Q'lKHK0M Commerce
Clause interpretation, effectively requires a physical presence within the
taxing state in order to uphold jurisdiction over an out-of-state seller.243
While physical presence has not been explicitly adopted, the Quill Court
upheld the longstanding prohibition against imposing tax collection duties
/0 'Q0S/+* NjL/*Q /0Hh T/00QT)K/0 jK)L T(*)/2Q+* K0 )LQ n)liK0Mm 9)l)Q K*
by common carrier or the United States mail.8244
Using market presence as a jurisdictional standard would likely be
unconstitutional under this strict formulation. However, though the
parameters of this rule may have made sense when initially decided, it is no
longer an effective regulator of interstate commerce.245 Market presence
would supplement physical presence in situations where physical
considerations are irrelevant or inapplicable by serving as a proxy-
jurisdictional predicate.246 Similar to the evolution of in personam
jurisdiction, physical presence will always be a valid jurisdictional
predicate. Adopting the market presence standard would simply allow states
to retain their jurisdictional power in situations where that power is defeated
by a technological progress.
b. Tax Must be Fairly Apportioned
Taxes on interstate activities must be confined to the portion of the
activity that took place within the taxing state.247 This requires that the state
Ndoes not undertake to tax any interstate activities carried on outside the
241. See supra Part II.A.
242. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
243. See supra Part I.A.
244. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (quoting HE:1X ;'XXE< Q'<<, 386 U.S. at 758).
245. See, e.g., id. at 327R28 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. This function is not unprecedented. The minimum contacts test from International Shoe
was created in part to address the growing obsolescence of the rigid physical presence requirement
from Pennoyer and its progeny. See FREER, supra note 93, at § 2.4.2.
247. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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state4s borders; and cannot be repeated by any other state.8248 Sales taxes
necessarily limit collection to activities within the taxing state.249 Only one
state and applicable local sales tax rate is applied to each transaction,250
which ensures that only one state is laying claim to the tax proceeds derived
from the sale. Other states cannot (currently) tax transactions that take place
in other states, so jurisdiction is limited to transactions occurring within that
*)l)Q4* /j0 k/+SQ+*a #0h lSSK)K/0lH )liQ* that the state tried to levy on other
aspects of the transaction, such as shipping or out-of-state storage in a
warehouse, would be a separate issue. Thus, market presence fairly
apportions the tax burden, and therefore satisfies the second prong.
c. Tax Must Not Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce
A tax is discriminatory if it N6provid[es] a direct commercial advantage
to local business4 . . . at the expense of out-of-state businesses.8251 Far from
being discriminatory, using market presence as a standard actually reduces
economic discrimination by correcting the discrepancy between interstate
and intrastate tax burdens. Discriminatory taxes are often discussed in
reference to protectionist taxes upon interstate commerce, but the reality is
that interstate commerce enjoys a substantial tax haven that is unavailable
to local intrastate businesses.
This safe harbor from taxation is necessary up to a certain point, as a
tax applied on a wholly equal basis would indirectly discriminate against
interstate vendors by imposing enormous compliance costs relative to their
intrastate counterparts. However, because modern computer technology
eliminates much of the traditional components of compliance costs,252 the
market presence standard ensures that sellers will have enough revenue
from online sales in the taxing state to cover compliance costs by the time
the threshold is reached.
The market presence standard does not economically favor one
category of commerce over the other. In addition, market presence actually
serves to reduce the type of discrimination referred to in the test itself.
Therefore, market presence satisfies the third prong.
248. Id. at 282 (quoting Memphis Nat. Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96R97 (1948)).
249. For exa2-HQc )LQ *)l)Q /O ZSlL/ Tl00/) TLl+MQ l *lHQ* )li /0 l ]H/+KSl j/2l04* l00(lH
K0T/2Q /+ /0 l !lHKO/+0Kl +Q)K+QQ4* -Q0*K/0 -lh2Q0)*a
250. The rate depends on what system of taxation is used. Destination-sourced systems charge
)LQ k(hQ+4* H/TlH +l)Qc jLKHQ /+KMK0-*/(+TQS *h*)Q2* TLl+MQ )LQ *QHHQ+4* H/TlH +l)Qa
251. "/*a 9)/TI ^iTLa 'a 9)l)Q 7li !/2240, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quoting Nw. States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
252. For example, rates can be calculated and returns can be filed via software programs rather
than manually. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 332 (1992) (White, J., concurring
K0 -l+) l0S SK**Q0)K0M K0 -l+)e fNn7mLQ T/*)* /O T/2-HKl0TQ a a a K0 HKML) /O )/Slh4* 2/SQ+0 T/2-()Q+
l0S */O)jl+Q )QTL0/H/Mhc l--Ql+ )/ kQ 0/2K0lHa8ea
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d. Tax Must be Fairly Related to the Services Provided by the
State
Under the fourth prong, a state4* )li will be sustained if it is N+QHl)QS )/
l T/+-/+l)K/04* H/TlH lT)K'K)KQ* l0S )LQ 9)l)Q Ll* -+/'KSQS kQ0QOK)* l0S
protections for those activities for which it is justified in asking a fair and
+Ql*/0lkHQ +Q)(+0a8253 The idea is that a state should only be able to tax
activities that it actively supports with its infrastructure and other benefits.
There is little danger of a state reaching activities for which it does not
provide benefits and protections, as sales taxes are inherently confined to
single occurrences taking place in defined locations. Thus, market presence
satisfies the fourth prong.
C. CRITICISMSOFMARKET PRESENCE&REBUTTALS
No single proposal creates a perfect equilibrium between interstate and
intrastate commerce. Like all others, market presence has its share of
weaknesses and potential areas of criticism. These include the possibility
that the proposal would not have much of an effect; the integration and
compliance costs imposed on those who trigger tax obligations; the absence
of a regulated system of certified software providers to design and maintain
the necessary software; and the potential for manipulation.
1. Adopting Market Presence as a Jurisdictional Standard
Would Not Have Much Effect
High thresholds, the use of gross profit as a measurement, and the
distribution of liability mean that only a small percentage of online retailers
will ultimately be affected by the adoption of market presence as a
jurisdictional standard. Indeed, liability thresholds are purposely set high
enough that a retailer must be a legitimate competitor in a given market to
trigger the threshold. This means that the majority of small-to-mid-size
retailers will continue to operate free of tax obligations. If so few are
affected, some might say, why bother trying to overhaul the system at all?
What is the point of all the upheaval if the end result will be largely similar
to the current system?
Limited reach is precisely one of the desired results of market presence.
The ultimate goal in using this standard is to have as many of the total sales
in a market as possible be transacted under the same set of tax rules.
Application to a small number of high-volume businesses is the most
efficient way to achieve this result and imposes the least possible
compliance cost on retailers in the market. With market presence, the size
and sales volume of a vendor is more important than the absolute number of
253. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 287 (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S.
100, 108 (1975)).
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firms affected. Thus, while only a small percentage of vendors will be
covered, a substantial percentage of overall electronic sales will be eligible
for tax collection.
Market presence only applies to retailers large enough to have an
appreciable negative effect on local governments and tax-burdened
competitors. These affected companies are those that not only have the
capacity to be a legitimate force in the market, but also large enough to take
full advantage of the interstate commerce tax haven and use it to exacerbate
their deleterious effect on the local economy. Small, sporadic retailers are
not the ones draining public coffers and putting local companies out of
business, so they are causing the problems that market presence seeks to
address. Imposing potentially significant compliance costs on economically
irrelevant companies without the cash flow to cover them not only cuts
against fairness concerns, but also begins to discriminate against interstate
commerce, both of which are prohibited under Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Furthermore, exempting small retailers is in line with the
stated Congressional intent to foster growth, productivity, and innovation
with regard to the Internet.254
The market presence standard seeks to strike a balance between
fostering and promoting small businesses and preventing large companies
from taking advantage of that loophole and, in the process, negatively
impacting local and regional markets. Ideally, market presence would only
apply to the sources of the problems in the retail industry and otherwise
allow commerce to continue as usual. Thus, the potential that only a small
portion of retailers would be affected is both desirable and perfectly in line
with the intent behind market presence.
2. Compliance and Integration Costs Will Be Enormous
Tax collection creates compliance costs, both in collecting the taxes up
front and in dealing with any potential liability that may arise after the fact.
The tax collection burden gets increasingly expensive as a company
becomes obligated to more and more taxing jurisdictions nationwide. These
expenses primarily take the form of the cost to implement and maintain rate
calculation software, potential litigation /'Q+ K**(Q* jK)L )LQ T/2-l0h4*
sales tax filings, and costs incurred when dealing with state audits.
The Supreme Court based their ruling in Bellas Hess partly on the
N'K+)(lH jQH)Q+ /O T/2-HKTl)QS /kHKMl)K/0* )/ H/TlH J(+K*SKT)K/0*8255 that
would result if each jurisdiction were allowed to tax its portion of interstate
commerce. Each new collection burden introduces an entirely new entity
the seller must report to, each with its own reporting standards and audit
procedures. Market presence does allow for the gradual accumulation of
254. See, e.g., Internet Tax Freedom Forever Act, S. 431, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
255. Ul)4H "QHHl* [Q** 'a pQ-4) /O :Q'Q0(Q /O ZHHac E@B 5a9a ACEc AB_ fG?BAea
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liability, as opposed to the MFA, which is all-or-nothing. Nonetheless, the
costs of compliance can rapidly build as more jurisdictions gain taxing
authority over the seller. Thus, critics claim that market presence, like all
destination-sourced tax schemes, imposes overly expansive and
burdensome costs on retailers, which adversely affects the burgeoning
industry of online retail.
Compliance costs are largely overstated at the front end, as the software
required for compliance is relatively cheap to produce and implement into
existing sales systems. Most of the cost of compliance is represented by the
potential for state audits or legal action against a company, especially when
the company is forced to deal with multiple states at once. Regardless,
market presence is inherently suited to deal with these costs intelligently
and gradually, putting companies in the best possible position to
comfortably absorb the costs of tax collection burdens.
Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, when rate calculations and tax
collections had to be performed and reported without the aid of computers.
Presumably, the sheer man-hours necessary to comply with taxing
jurisdictions across the country would have deterred many companies from
expanding. However, the compliance process is hugely simplified by the
advent of modern computers.256A program to calculate tax rates would only
require the creation of a simple database in which to store the various tax
rates as well as a program for searching and selecting desired rates at
appropriate times.
Databases *(TL l* )LK* j/(HS kQ NK0T+QSKkHh Ql*h )/ SQ*KM0. Any
(0SQ+M+lS(l)Q T/2-()Q+ *TKQ0TQ 2lJ/+ T/(HS S/ K)a8257 In fact, a simple
online search will find a number of free websites and software programs
that not only calculate the local and state tax rate for any address in the
United States, but also provide free registration, filing, and remittance
services as well as services to identify and apply tax exemptions.258
Regardless of the cost, the threshold requirement helps to ensure that the
seller has both sufficient revenue to cover software expenses up front as
well as enough taxable income to later expense those costs and reduce the
*QHHQ+4* K0T/2Q )li k(+SQ0 lccordingly.
In addition to compliance on the front end, the potential for audits and
litigation on the back end also poses a threat to sellers. While not
insignificant, these costs are inherent in any business venture. Ideally, the
threshold requirement would allow the seller to generate enough cash flow
to handle audits or litigation by the time they arose, if they even occur at all.
Besides maintenance and upkeep, the front end software costs are mostly
256. Quill, 504 U.S. at 332 (White, J., dissenting) (N)LQ T/*)* /O T/2-HKl0TQ a a a K0 HKML) /O )/b
Slh4* 2/SQ+0 T/2-()Q+ l0S */O)jl+Q )QTL0/H/Mhc l--Ql+ )/ kQ 0/2K0lH8ea
257. Telephone Interview with Terry Haynes, Student, Tulane University (Dec. 4, 2014).
258. See Nationwide Local Sales Tax Calculator, TAXCLOUD, https://taxcloud.net/find-a-rate/
(last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
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nonrecurring, */ )LQ *QHHQ+4* lkKHK)h )/ lk*/+k potential back-end costs grows
significantly as time progresses.
Finally, the market presence threshold allows companies to
compartmentalize audit and litigation risk by gradually accumulating tax
obligations according to its financial ability. Increasing audit and litigation
risk means that cash flow is also increasing as the company grows its
presence in relevant markets. In addition, this gradual accumulation allows
2l0lMQ2Q0) )/ )+Ql) )LQ T/2-l0h4* +K*I exposure as a sort of investment
portfolioPthe danger posed by audits and litigation is reduced as the risk of
incurring these costs grows. At a certain point, the principles of
diversification begin to apply, so that the potential adverse impact of
litigation or audit in one state is simultaneously offset by cash flow
stemming from all of the other states in which the company is not facing
potential adversity.
It is true that certain costs of compliance have the potential to seriously
K2-lT) l *QHHQ+4* OK0l0TKlH LQlH)Lc but the overall problem is largely
overstated. Advances in computing technology have significantly reduced
many traditional compliance costs. For those costs that do arise, the
threshold limitation on market presence serves to incubate the retailer until
compliance costs can be dealt with comfortably. Furthermore, compliance
costs are inherent to any business venture, and are certainly issues that local
retailers have to deal with when expanding into new markets.
3. System is Easy to Manipulate
One of the major drawbacks of any destination-sourced system of
taxation is that it is prone to manipulation. There is nothing to stop a buyer
from simply shipping purchases to a friend or relative who lives in a low
tax jurisdiction. When the goods arrive, the buyer can choose to either
physically pick them up or have the other party re-ship the package to his or
her true address. This method of circumvention would be as simple as
entering an alternate shipping address when making the purchase. As a
result, critics say it is not worth the time and effort to implement a
destination-sourced system, as the ease of avoidance largely defeats the
purpose.
The critics are correct in this situation, as this is always a possibility
with destination sourcing. However, the potential impact of this loophole is
greatly overstated. First and foremost, the difference in tax paid on an
average purchase would be nowhere near enough money to make this tactic
worth the extra time and effort required. Driving to pick it up personally,
assuming the buyer owns a personal vehicle, requires money for gasoline as
well as )LQ /--/+)(0K)h T/*) /O SQSKTl)K0M L/(+* /O /0Q4* Slh )/ )+l'QH.
Similarly, having the goods re-shipped incurs extra shipping costs in
addition to the opportunity cost of time spent waiting even longer for a
purchase that could have been received and put to use days before. The
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amount of tax avoided will almost never be enough to justify using these
types of schemes, and so will not be of much significance.
Having said that, the entire argument is moot, as the situation described
above can be done today and indeed has effectively been happening for
years. Shipping goods to a low-tax jurisdiction to pick up later is no
different than simply driving to that same location and purchasing the goods
in-store at a local retailer. The tax rate would be identical and all actions
would require the same amount of time, effort, and money to complete,
except that the item is at a store in one scenario and sitting at some/0Q4*
house in the other scenario. The second optionPdelivery and re-
shipmentPis practically indistinguishable from having the friend or relative
in the low-tax area simply purchase the item themselves and ship it to the
buyer. In fact, the current scenario is even more effective, as it removes the
time and dollar costs of the initial shipment, making it a more attractive
option. Therefore, if this type of scheme is not already causing widespread
adversity within the taxpaying world, there is no basis for believing that it
would suddenly become a problem with a destination-sourced system of tax
collection.
In short, the potential for manipulation will always be present in some
shape or form, regardless of the tax structure in place. This method in
particularPusing alternate locations to manipulate tax ratesPcan and does
occur under the current system and is in no way a characteristic inherent to
the proposed jurisdictional standard. In fact, destination-sourced systems
such as this operate similar to traditional purchasesPthe tax rate paid
online is the exact same as what the buyer would pay in person at that
location, regardless of where the buyer chooses to make the purchase.
CONCLUSION
The expansion of e-commerce will undoubtedly continue to
revolutionize the retail industry on both sides of the transaction. Online
marketplaces provide retailers unprecedented opportunities for market
penetration and consumer engagement unrestrained by physical limitation.
Consumers similarly have an expansive array of choices and offerings
available, as well as corresponding repositories of product information and
peer reviews to guide their choice. Most significantly, the Internet allows
almost anyone to purchase almost anything from almost anywhere in the
country, if not the world.
This new electronic frontier has grown from its infancy to an economic
heavyweight in such a relatively short period of time that the legal
framework simply has not had time to catch up. Standards and rules
lS/-)QS K0 )LQ G?B_4* l+Q K0l--HKTlkHQ K0 the context of modern e-
commerce, and the resulting gap in legal guidance is having a growing
effect on the rest of the economy. The jurisdictional standard in this Note
provides a practical, effective solution that works in conjunction with
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current tax policy and practices. The threshold requirements act as crucial
limitations on state power while also functioning as an insurance policy of
sorts against potential compliance costs. Gross profit provides the most
objective and fair basis of classification and discourages inefficient tax
avoidance. Finally, this can all be accomplished with cheap, simple, and
widely available database software.
Market presence does nothing more than apply existing rules to retailers
that had enjoyed a brief immunity from tax liability while the law caught
up. Far from being a significant policy change, it simply re-applies the same
obligations that all businesses had to deal with in the past and that
businesses with physical locations have to deal with today. It is inevitable
that Internet retail will continue to grow and become an increasingly
important part of everyday life. Fortunately, there is still room for positive
economic guidance. Using market presence to supplement existing
jurisdictional standards will ensure that the growth of e-commerce is
structured, positive, and ultimately beneficial to the economic health of the
country.
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